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1 The term ‘postmorten city’  was first coined by Chris Hables Gray in his book Postmodern War 
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bombing devastated the city  on March 9th/10th, 1945. This raid -- the most murderous act of war 
in human history -- killed over 130,000 civilians in a few hours (see Gray, 1997, 86) 
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Figure 1  Typical post-annihilation analyses of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of 1947. 
This involved detailed assessments of the effectiveness of incendiary and atomic bombs in 
destroying the various types, structures and contents of Japanese urban spaces as though 
the killing of a million Japanese civilians were some giant physical experiment. 1(a) Fire 
Damage map of the small Japanese city of Ube (USSBS 1947b, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 79) ; 1(b) 
Percentage of urban Japan which were ‘successfully’ incinerated according to the dominant 
land use (USSBS, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 45). Of all the 64 cities burnt, the Survey concluded that 
“Tokyo was the best-burning of them all” (USSBS 1947b, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 38). 
 
Figure 2 ‘Operation Anchor’ : The use of explosives by British occupying forces to carve 
boulevards through the Palestinian casbah in Jaffa (now part of Tel Aviv) in 1936. This 
was done in order to improve the strategic control of the British over the settlement 
(source : Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003, 275) 
 
Figure 3 Illustration’s from John Mansbridge’s (n.d) British World War II pamphlet Here 
Comes Tomorrow celebrating both the modernism of aircraft and the ‘new chance’ their 
bombing offered British cities to rebuild along modernist lines (source : Tiratsoo et al, 
2002, 57). 
 
Figure 4 A series of video capture images showing the claw of an Israeli Defense Force  
D-9 Bulldozer being used to destroy a Palestinian road and water network in Bethlehem 
as part of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, April 2002. Photographer : A Palestinian activist 
who wishes to remain anonymous. 
 
Figure 5 The banality of urbicide : Israeli Defense Force soldiers preparing to blow up a 
Palestinian home in the Tul Quarem refugee camp in the West Bank, 2002 -- one of 
over 7,000 carefully planned house demolitions in the occupied territories since 1967 . 
Photographer : Nir Kafri, 2003. 
 
Figure 6  Aerial photograph of the destruction of the Hart-Al-Hawashin district in the 
centre of the Jenin refugee camp caused by Israeli D-9 bulldozers at the end of the 
battle of Jenin in April 2002 (used by permission from Public Relations Branch, Israeli 
Defense Forces) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction : Confronting Place Annihilation in Urban Research 
 
 “As long as people have lived in cities, they have been haunted 
by fears of urban ruin […]. Every city on earth is ground zero is 
somebody’s doomsday book” (Berman, 1996, 175-184) 
   
“To be sure, a cityscape is not made of flesh. Still, sheared-off 
buildings are almost as eloquent as body parts (Kabul, Sarajevo, 
East Mostar, Grozny, 16 acres of lower Manhattan after 
September 11th 2001, the refugee camp in Jenin). Look, the 
photographs say, this is what it’s like. This is what war does. War 
tears, war rends. War rips open, eviscerates. War scorches. War 
dismembers. War ruins” (Sontag, 2003, 5) 
 
“Today, wars are fought not in trenches and fields, but in living 
rooms, schools and supermarkets” (Barakat, 1998 11 ) 
 
Cities, warfare, and organised, political violence have always been mutual constructions. “The 
city, the polis, is constitutive of the form of conflict called war, just as war is itself constitutive 
of the political form called the city ” (Virilio, 2002, 5, original emphasis). War and the city have 
intimately shaped each other throughout urban and military history. “There is […] a direct 
reciprocity between war and cities”, writes the geographer Ken Hewitt. “The latter are the 
more thoroughgoing constructs of collective life, containing the definitive human places.  War 
is the most thorough-going or consciously prosecuted occasion of collective violence that 
destroys places” (1983, 258).    
 
The widespread survival of massive urban fortifications -- especially in Asia, North Africa, 
Europe and parts of Latin America – are a living testament to the fact that in pre-modern and 
pre nation-state civilisations, city-states were the actual agents, as well as the main targets, of 
war.  In pre-modern times cities were built for defence as well as dominant centres of 
commerce, exchange and political, religious and social power.  ”The city, with its buttressed 
walls, its ramparts and moats, stood as an outstanding display of ever-threatening 
aggression” (Mumford, 1961, 44).  
 
The sacking and killing of fortified cities and their inhabitants was the central event in pre-
modern war (Weber, 1958). Indeed  (often allegorical) stories of such acts make up a good 
part of the Bible – especially Jeremiah and Lamentations -- and other ancient and classical 
religious and philosophical texts. “Myths of urban ruin grow at our culture’s root”  (Berman, 
1996). 
 
In the 16th and 17th centuries, as modern nation states started to emerge in Europe as 
‘bordered power containers’, they began seeking a monopoly on political violence (Giddens, 
1985). “The states caught up with the forward gallop of the towns” (Braudel, 1973, 398).  The 
expanding imperial and metropolitan cities that lay at the core of nation-states were no longer 
organisers of their own armies and defences. But they maintained political power and reach. 
Military, political, and economic elites within such cities directed violence, control, repression, 
and the colonial acquisition of territory, raw materials, wealth, and labour power from afar 
(Driver and Gilbert, 2003).  
 
By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, industrial cities in the global north had grown in 
synchrony with the killing powers of technology. They provided the men and material to 
sustain the massive, industrial wars on the twentieth century. At the same time their (often 
female-staffed) industries and neighbourhoods emerged as the prime targets for total war.  
The industrial city  thus became “in its entirety a space for war. Within a few years […] 
bombing moved from the selective destruction of key sites within cities to extensive attacks on 
urban areas and, finally, to instantaneous annihilation of entire urban spaces and populations” 
(Shaw, 2003, 131). Right up to the present day, the capture of  strategic and politically 
important cities has “remained the ultimate symbol, of conquest and national survival” (Shaw, 
2001, 1).  
 
Given the centrality of both urbanization and the prosecution of political violence to modernity, 
this subtle inter-penetration of cities and warfare should be no surprise. “After all, modernity, 
through most of its career, has been modernity at war” (Pieterse, 2002, 3). It is no longer 
feasible to contain cities within defensive walls or effective cordons which protect their citizens 
from military force (Virilio, 1987). But the deliberate destruction and targeting of cities and 
their support systems in times of war and crisis is a constant throughout the eight thousand 
years or so of urban history on our planet. “Destruction of places”, Hewitt continues, writing in 
1987: 
“driven by fear and hatred, runs through the whole history of wars, from ancient 
Troy or Carthage, to Warsaw and Hiroshima in our own century. The miseries, 
uprootings, and deaths of civilians in besieged cities, especially after defeat, 
stand amongst the most terrible indictments of the powerful and victorious. In that 
sense, there is, despite the progress of weapons of devastation, a continuity in 
the experience of civilians from Euripides’ Trojan Women or The Lamentations of 
Jeremiah, to the cries of widowed women and orphaned children in Beirut, 
Belfast, the villages of Afghanistan, and those of El Salvador” (469) 
 
Cities, then, provide much more than just the backdrop or environment for war and terror. 
Rather, their buildings, assets, institutions, industries, infrastructures, cultural diversities, and 
symbolic meanings have long actually themselves been the explicit target for a wide range 
of deliberate, orchestrated, attacks. This essential, urban, spatiality of organised, political 
violence is rarely recognised in the obsessively chronological and temporal gaze of the 
historians who dominate the study of the urban violence of the 20th century. Thus, the 
architectures, urbanisms, and spatial planning strategies that  sustain, reflect, and are 
intrinsic to strategies of informal and state terror all too often get overlooked (Cole, 2003, 
chapter 2).   
 
For this explicit concentration on the (attempted) killing of cities in modern war, the 
geographer Ken Hewitt has coined the term ‘place annihilation’ (1983). “For a social scientist”, 
he stresses that “it is actually imperative to ask just who dies and whose places are destroyed 
by violence” within such wars of place annihilation (1987, 464, original emphasis). This is 
because such strategies are usually far from indiscriminate. Commonly, they involve a great 
deal of planning so that the violence and destruction achieves the political, social, economic, 
ecological and cultural effects, on the target population and their places, that are desired by 
the attackers.  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, this dominance of war casualties by civilians, rather than 
enlisted military personnel, has only accelerated further. Between 1989 and 1998, for 
example, 4 million people were killed in violent conflicts across the world. An estimated 90% 
of these were civilians -- primarily women and children (Pieterse, 2002, 1). In short, since the 
end of the Cold War – with its global threat of instant urban-nuclear annihilation --  “we have 
gone from fearing the death of the city to fearing the city of death” (Lang, 1995, 71). As 
traditional state-vs.-state wars in open terrain have become objects of curiosity, so the 
informal, ‘asymmetric’ or ‘new’ wars which tend to centre on localised struggles over strategic 
urban sites have become the norm (Kaldor, 1999). As Misselwitz and Weizman suggest: 
“It is now clear that the days of the classical, Clauswitzian definition of 
warfare as a symmetrical engagement between state armies in the open field 
are over. War has entered the city again – the sphere of the everyday, the 
private realm of the house” (2003, 272). 
  
Far from going away, then, strategies of deliberately attacking the systems and places that 
support civilian urban life have only become more sophisticated since World War II. The 
deliberate devastation of urban living spaces continues apace. Fuelling it is a powerful 
cocktail of intermeshing factors. Here we must consider the collapse of the Cold War 
equilibrium ; the unleashing of previously constrained ethnic hatreds ; the proliferation of 
fundamentalist religious and political groups ; and the militarisation of gangs, drug cartels, 
militia, corrupt political regimes, and law enforcement agencies. We must address the failure 
of many national and local states ; the urbanisation of populations and terrain ;  and the 
growing accessibility to heavy weapons. Finally, the growing crisis of social polarisation at all 
geographical scales and the increasing scarcity of many essential resources must be 
considered (Castells, 1997, 1998).  
 
To this cocktail we must add the destabilising effects of the United State’s increasingly 
aggressive and violent interventions in a widening range of nations, and the deleterious 
impacts of  neoliberal restructuring and ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, imposed on 
many nations by the IMF and WTO.  Such programmes have added to the sense of crisis in 
many cities because they have resulted in the erosion of social and economic security and 
the further immiseration of the urban poor (and, increasingly, the middle classes, too).  
 
All this has happened at a time when the scale of urbanisation is at an unprecedented global 
level. During the 1990s alone the world’s urban population grew by 36%. By 2003 900 million 
people lived in slums. And the deepening polarisation of cities, caused by neoliberal 
globalisation, is providing many conditions that are ripe for extremes of civil, and militarised, 
violence  (Vidal, 2003, Castells, 1997, 1998).  In fact, neoliberal globalisation itself operates 
through a vast scale of violence, exploitation and criminality which works in similarly 
‘rhizomatic’ ways to transnational terrorism. “Our own politicians and businesses sail a  
strikingly similar pirate sea [to the al-Qaeda network]”, suggests Keller Easterling: 
  “slipping between legal jurisdictions, leveraging advantages in the differential 
value of labor and currency, brandishing national identity one moment and 
laundering it the next, using lies and disguises to neutralize cultural or political 
differences” (2002, 189) 
 
In many cases some or all of these factors have combined in the post-Cold War to force 
nothing less than the “implosion of global and national politics into the urban world” (Appadurai, 
1996, 152).  This has led to a proliferation of bloody, largely urban, wars. Many of these, in 
turn, stimulate vast migrations and the construction of city-scale refugee camps to 
accommodate the displaced populations (which stood at a  global figure of 50 million by 
2002)(Agier, 2002, Diken and Lausten, 2003).  
 
Appadurai  argues that such ‘new’ urban wars “take their energy from macroevents and 
processes […] that link global politics to the micropolitics of streets and neighbourhoods” 
(1996, 152-153). He observes that:  
“In the conditions of ethnic unrest and urban warfare that characterize cities 
such as Belfast and Los Angeles, Ahmedabad and Sarajevo, Mogadishu and 
Johannesburg, urban war zones are becoming armed camps, driven wholly by 
implosive forces that fold into neighborhoods the most violent and problematic 
repercussions of wider regional, national and global processes […]. [These 
cases] represent a new phase in the life of cities, where the concentration of 
ethnic populations, the availability of heavy weaponry, and the crowded 
conditions of civic life create futurist forms of warfare […] and where a general 
desolation of the national and global landscape has transposed many bizarre 
racial, religious, and linguistic enmities into scenarios of unrelieved urban 
terror””  (Appadurai, 1996, 152-193, original emphasis). 
 
All of which means that contemporary warfare and terror now largely boil down to contests 
over the spaces, symbols, meanings, support systems or power structures of cities and 
urban regions.  As a result, war, ‘terrorism’ and cities are redefining each other in complex, 
but poorly explored ways. Such redefinitions are, in turn, bound up with deeper shifts in the 
ways in which time, space, technology, mobility and power and constructed and 
experienced in our societies as a whole (Virilio, 1986). 
 
Given all of this, it is curious, then, that  warfare and organised political violence targeting the 
spaces, inhabitants, and support systems of cities have been persistently neglected in critical 
social scientific debates about cities and urbanisation since World War II (Mendieta, this 
issue).   By contrast, this period has seen vast libraries filled with theoretical, empirical and 
policy books addressing urban de-velopment, con-struction, re-generation, modernisation  
and growth (Bishop and Clancey, 2003). In 1983 the geographer Ken Hewitt argued that, from 
the perspective of urban social science, the “destruction of cities, as of much else, remains 
terra incognita” (Hewitt, 1983, 258).   
 
Another cocktail of factors have can be diagnosed to help explain this neglect.  Three are 
particularly important. First, a  simple, and understandable, desire to forget the scale and 
barbarity of urban slaughter in the last century can be diagnosed. For example, many wider 
cultural taboos have inhibited dispassionate, social scientific analyses of the aerial 
annihilations of German and Japanese cities in World War II (although these are now slowly 
being overcome  -- see Sebold, 2002). In the Anglo-Saxon world, whilst the ‘air war’ that killed 
perhaps 1.6 million urbanites in those two countries is widely glorified and fetishised --  what 
Chris Hables Gray calls “bomber glorioso” (1997, 87) -- equally powerful taboos, and the 
instinct to self-censor, have meant that the perspective here has been overwhelmingly  aerial. 
The annihilated cities, and the hundreds of thousands of carbonised dead on the ground, 
barely exist at all in these popular narratives. When they are represented, huge controversy 
still ensues. The victims of more recent US bombings in Kabul and Baghdad have been 
rendered equally invisible and uncounted by the ferocious power of western propaganda and 
self-censorship. An ‘information operations’ campaign has also emerged that leads US forces 
to bomb any independent TV station that has the temerity to show the civilian carnage that 
results, on the ground, even with so-called ‘precision strikes’ – the inevitable reality behind the 
repulsive euphemisms of ‘collateral damage’ in urban bombing.   
 
Second, Ryan Bishop and Bishop Clancey (2002, 64), have recently suggested that modern 
urban social science in general has shown marked tendencies since World War II to directly 
avoid tropes of catastrophism (especially in the west). They argue that this is because the 
complete annihilation of urban places conflicted with its underlying, enlightenment-tinged 
notions of progress, order and modernisation.  In the post-war, Cold War, period, especially, 
“The City”, they write, had a “heroic status in both capitalist and socialist storytelling” (66). 
This worked against an analysis of the city as a scene of catastrophic death.  “The city-as-
target” remained, therefore, “a reading long buried under layers of academic Modernism” 
(ibid. 67).  
 
Bishop and Clancey also believe that this “absence of death within The City also reflected the 
larger economy of death within the academy : its studied absence from some disciplines 
[urban social science] and compensatory over-compensation in others [history]” (ibid.).  In 
disciplinary terms, the result of this was that  the ‘urban’ tended to remain hermetically 
separated  from the ‘strategic’. ‘Military’ issues were carefully demarcated from ‘civil’ ones.  
And the overwhelmingly ‘local’ concerns of modern urban social science were kept rigidly 
apart from (inter)national ones. This left urban social science to address the local, civil, and 
domestic rather than the (inter)national, the military or the strategic. Such concerns were the 
preserve of history, as well as the fast-emerging disciplines of international politics and 
international relations. In the dominant hubs of English-speaking urban social science – North 
America and the UK -- these two intellectual worlds virtually never crossed, separated as they 
were by disciplinary boundaries, scalar orientations, and theoretical traditions.  
 
Th final factor stems from the fact that urban social science finished sedimenting into modern 
intellectual disciplines during the Cold War. During this time, urban annihilation, always 
minutes away,  was simply a step on the way to a broader, species-wide, exterminism 
(Mumford, 1959,  Thompson et al, 1982). This also seems to have inhibited critical urban 
research on place annihilation. Waves of secrecy and paranoia about the urban-targeting 
strategies of the super powers further worked to undermine critical analysis of what nuclear 
Armageddon would actually mean for an urbanising planet (Vanderbilt, 2003).  And the 
inevitable vulnerabilities of cities to nuclear attack were exploited by a wide range of interests 
seeking to radically decentralise, and de-urbanise, advanced industrial societies (Farish, 
2002, Light, 2003).  As Herbert Muschamp has argued, cities were, in many ways,  “among 
the casualties” of the Cold War years (1995, 106). 
 
Encouragingly, the persistent neglect of place annihilation in urban research has been slowly 
overcome since Hewitt wrote the above words. A broadening range of promising work has 
emerged in critical and interdisciplinary urban research, particularly in the pages of City  2. 
Unfortunately, however, such work has yet to gain the momentum necessary to bring the 
critical analysis of place annihilation into the heart of urban social science.  It is still the case, 
for example, that only a small number of volumes have systematically delved into the dark 
terrain which emerges where the city become a pre-eminent site for political violence, 
warfare, ‘terrorism’ ; where urban de-struction, devastation, de-generation, de-modernisation, 
and annihilation haunt dreams of urban modernity and development ;  and where the promise 
of the city reveals its Janus-face in orgies of hatred, killing, murder, bombing and violence 
(see Picon, 1996,  Lang, 1995, Ashworth, 1991, Vanderbilt, 2002, Davis, 2002, Cole, 2003, 
Schneider and Susser, 2003). 
 
The starting point for this essay is that, in our post Cold-War and post 9/11 world, both the 
informal (‘terrorist’) and the formal (state) violence, war and terror that are engulfing our 
planet are actually constituted by the systematic and planned targeting of cities and urban 
                                                
2 See, for example,  Catterall (2001), Mendieta (2001), Safier, (2001), Prodanovich (2002), 
Coward (2001), Berman (1996), Diken and Lausten  (2002), Lang (1995), Farish (2003), 
Vanderbilt (2002), Davis (2002), Schneider and Susser (2003), Cole (2003), Bishop and Clancey 
(2003), Gregory, (2003), Bollens (2001), Graham (2003, 2004 a, b, c). 
places. This extended essay seeks to place such attacks – and the wider ‘state of 
emergency’ within which they are embedded --- within their theoretical and historical context.  
In so doing, I aim to help urban social research to further confront the taboos which have, 
over the last fifty years, tended to inhibit research on, and recognition for, organised political 
violence against cities within critical social science.   
 
In particular, my purpose in this extended essay, drawing on Paul Virilio’s (1996) term, is to 
start mapping out what a specifically urban  geopolitics might amount to.  I take ‘geopolitics’ 
here to mean a concern with understanding the discourses, strategies and structures which 
emerge at the intersections of territory, spatiality, and political power and violence (Agnew 
and Corbridge, 1995). This essay’s central concern is to argue that the parallel 
transformations of urbanism and political violence in the post Cold war period, and the 
increasing constitution of war and terror by acts of violence carefully targeted against urban, 
local sites, makes the development of such a specifically urban geopolitics an urgent 
imperative.  As states, wars, empires, resistance movements, terror networks and economic, 
social and cultural formations are reconstituted, in parallel, into stretched, transnational  
webs which intersect, and constitute, the same sets of strategic urban sites, so this 
imperative will only gain more momentum.  
 
It follows that there is an urgent, parallel, need for the real recent progress in developing a 
critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1999) to move beyond an exclusive concern for nation-states, 
international relations, and international terror networks. Critical geopolitics must also 
become sub-national. This is necessary so that the increasingly crucial roles of strategic 
urban places as geopolitical sites can be profitably analysed.  A blizzard of questions 
provides fuel here. For example,  on our rapidly urbanising planet, how does the control, 
targeting, destruction, and reconstruction of urban sites intersect with changing geopolitical 
structures and discourses ? How are cities, and urban everyday life, being affected both by 
the umbilically connected interplay of terror and counter-terror? What roles do constructions, 
and imaginations, of ‘homeland’ and ‘non-homeland’ cities play within the emerging US 
‘Empire’, a hegemonic neoliberalism, and a proliferation of sites and sources of resistance 
(Hardt and Negry, 2000) ? What place do the systems of mobility, communication, 
infrastructure and logistics that are so central to contemporary urban life play, as targets and 
weapons, within the emerging crisis ? How does the urbanisation of terrain influence the 
‘assymetric wars’  that are emerging which pitch high-tech western and U.S. forces against 
both poorly equipped local fighters and anti-globalisation movements ?  Finally, what are the 
prospects for creatively blending critical urban and geopolitical theory  to match the parallel 
rescaling of political violence and urbanism in today’s world ? 
 
In sum, this essay has been written in the belief that both a specifically geopolitical 
urbanism, and a specifically urban geopolitics, are now urgently required. A constructive 
dialogue between such usually separated research communities would, I believe, open up 
many extremely promising avenues for theory, analysis and activism. What follows is 
designed to help such a dialogue along. To achieve this, my simple aim is to help illustrate 
the inseparability of war, terror and modern urbanism. I do this by revealing a range of 
‘hidden histories’ of what I call the ‘dark side’ of urban modernity – the propensity for urban 
life to be attacked, destroyed or annihilated in acts of organised violence.  
 Ten Tales of Urban Geopolitics :  
On The  ‘Dark’ Side of Urban Modernity  
 
“Biologists have prepared ‘red books’ of extinct or endangered species; 
ecologists have their ‘green books’ of threatened habitats. Perhaps we need 
our ‘black book’ of the places destroyed or nearly destroyed by human 
agencies. Actually it would take many books and street maps packed with 
rememberances to record the settlements, neighbourhoods, and buildings in 
those places destroyed in recent wars”  (Hewitt, 1987, 275) 
 
Arguably, humankind has expended almost as much energy, effort and thought to the 
annihilation and killing of cities as it has on their growth, planning and construction.  Such city 
annihilation or urban warfare requires purposive work. It needs detailed analysis. Often, it 
involves ‘scientific’ planning and operational strategy-making of extraordinary complexity and 
sophistication. Thus, it is necessary to assume that a continuum exists connecting acts of 
building and physical restructuring, on the one hand, and acts of all out, organised war on the 
other. By way of mapping the diverse ways in which place annihilation is utterly intrinsic to 
both urban modernity, and modern urbanism and planning, I offer below a range of ten  
illustrative ‘tales’. 
 
Architectures of Annihilation : The ‘War Ideology of the Plan’ 
 First, civilian urban planning, development, modernisation and restructuring often actually 
involve levels of devastation of cities, ruination, and forced resettlement  that match that 
which occurs in all-out war. Even in supposedly democratic societies, planned urban 
restructuring often involves autocratic state violence, massive urban destruction, the 
devastation of livelihoods, and even mass death.  In both authoritarian and democratic 
societies, ideologies of urban planning have often actually invoked metaphors of war and 
militarism. This has been wisely practised as a means of comparing the purported need for 
violent restructuring in cities to achieve desired effects  with the mass violence of states. 
Anthony Vidler (2001, 38) calls this “the war ideology of the plan”.  
 
Thus, place annihilation can be thought of as a kind of hidden – and sometimes not so hidden 
-- planning history (see Sandercock, 1998). The planned devastation and killing of cities is a 
dark side of the discipline of urban planning that is rarely acknowledged, let alone analysed. It 
is rarely realised, for example,  that the analytical and statistical methods so often used in 
post-WWII civilian planning have also been used – sometimes by the same demographic, 
economic, and planning ‘experts’ – to spatially organise the Apartheid regime in South Africa ; 
to plan the systematic fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities ; to organise the house by 
house demolition of Warsaw in 1945 ;  to set up the giant urban-regional process of the 
Holocaust ; or to starve many Easter European cities and regions  into submission in the mid 
1940s. The latter work even involved the founder of Central Place Theory, that seminal 
economic geographer, Walter Christaller – star of any school human geography course. He 
was employed by the Nazis to rethink the economic geography of an ‘Aryanised’ Eastern 
Europe, a process linked directly to the planned starvation and forced migration of millions of 
people   (see Aly and Heim, 2002,  Rössler, 1989).   
 
Mock German and Japanese housing units, complete with authentic roofing materials, 
furniture, and clothing, were erected in Nevada to allow the incendiaries that would later burn 
Dresden and Tokyo to be carefully customised for their intended targets (Davis, 2002, 65-84). 
“The combustibility of Japanese dwellings was well illustrated by tests made in this country”, 
recalled the US Strategic Bombing Survey in 1947(a, 72): 
 “Four buildings were constructed: two in ‘typical Japanese fashion’ {and} the 
other two to comply with the latest Tokyo fire regulations […]. The four 
structures were set on fire to determine the time necessary for their destruction. 
Those constructed in ‘typical Japanese fashion’ burned to the ground in 12 
minutes; those constructed  in accordance to Tokyo fire regulations were 
consumed in 32 minutes” 
 
The USSBS was the apogee  of  the systematic evaluation of the ‘success’ of urban planning 
for mass death. In it, thousands of operation scientists, architects, engineers and urban 
statisticians pored over every urban bomb blast in Japan and Germany in an effort to improve 
the ‘efficiency’ of the city-killing process (Figure 1). To predict the effects of the ‘A’-bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a ‘Japanese village’ was even constructed -- again in Nevada -- 
complete with all sorts of realistic Japanese-style and buildings and infrastructures 
(Vanderbilt, 2002).  
 
Figure 1a,b  Typical post-annihilation analyses of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey of 1947. 
This involved detailed assessments of the effectiveness of incendiary and atomic bombs in 
destroying the various types, structures and contents of Japanese urban spaces as though 
the killing of a million Japanese civilians were some giant physical experiment. 1(a) Fire 
Damage map of the small Japanese city of Ube (USSBS 1947b, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 79) ; 1(b) 
Percentage of urban Japan which were ‘successfully’ incinerated according to the dominant 
land use (USSBS, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 45). Of all the 64 cities burnt, the Survey concludede that 
“Tokyo was the best-burning of them all” (USSBS 1947b, vol. Ix, chapter 3, 38). 
 
Similarly grim work goes on and on. More recently, the US and Israeli militaries have co-
operated to construct and run a kind of shadow  urban system of complete cities, replete with 
authentic ‘Islamic’ features, in order to train the marines and soldiers who invaded Baghdad, 
Basra and Jenin (Graham, 2003).   
 
It is also scarcely realised that demographers, statisticians, geographers, architects and 
planners have been central to Israel’s efforts to deepen its control over the three dimensional 
spaces of the Occupied Territories. Their analyses and prescriptions have helped to shape 
the annexing of Palestinian land, the construction of walls and ‘buffer zones’, the mass 
bulldozing of houses, the ethnic cleansing of selected areas, the construction of  carefully 
located Jewish settlements and access roads, or the appropriation of water and airspace 
(Weizman, 2004, Graham, 2003).  
 
‘Planning’ and Occupation as War on the Colonised City 
 “One of the achievements of the great wave of modernization that began in 
the late 18th century was to incorporate urbicide into the process of urban 
development […]. Its victims, along with their neighbourhoods and towns 
vanish without a trace” (Berman, 1996, 181). 
 
In our second illustration, many strategies of occupation and colonisation have been based 
explicitly on the planned destruction and devastation of cities. Urban ‘planning’ in many 
colonised cities often amounted to little but the planned devastation and bulldozing of 
indigenous cities to underpin the strategic control of the occupiers of settlers (Said, 1993, see 
Maldonado-Torres, this issue).  Here the ‘orderly’ imprints of western-style urban planning 
and property law have long been used as a form of urban warfare (Blomley, 2003).  First, this 
was done to quell local insurgencies in non-western, colonised cities. Later, such militarised 
planning strategies were often imported back to the homeland to reshape the great imperial 
capitals for similar purposes (Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003).   
 
The first special manual on ‘urban warfare’ was produced in 1847  by the French army  to 
show how troops could ruthlessly put down insurrections in Algiers which were then erupting,  
led by Abdel Kager. This book, La Guerre des Rues at des Maison, was authored by the 
leader of the French Forces,  Bugeaud (1997). After a bloody, seven-year  struggle in a 
classic ’asymmetric’ urban war -- with 100,000 French troops pitched against 10,0000 local 
resistance fighters -- Bugeaud simply destroyed entire neighbourhoods in the dense Algiers 
Casbah. In the process he committed many atrocities against civilians and fighters alike and 
imprinted massive avenues through the City to sustain military surveillance and movement. 
This broke the resistance (for a time, at least) (Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003)..  
 
In a process that would be paralleled many times later, these techniques were then used to 
inform urban planning strategies to quell civil and social unrest in the ‘homeland’, imperial 
centres of the colonising powers. Bugeaud’s doctrines, for example, had a major influence on 
Baron Haussmann in the 1870s, as he violently imprinted a strategy of massive boulevards 
and canon firing-arcs on Paris, partly for the sake of improving the strategic control of the 
State on the volatile capital (Misselwitz and Weizman, 2003).  In the process “Haussmann 
draped a façade of theatres, cafes and shops over boulevards laid out for the benefits of the 
troops who might be called upon to quell civil disturbance” (Muschamp, 1995, 105). 
 
Thus, the anti-urban rhetoric of ruling élites tended to see both colonised and ‘home’ cities as 
morally toxic hotbeds of unrest that needed to be ‘regularised’ and disciplined through similar, 
violent, urban restructuring efforts. “If strategic urban design previously focused on 
strengthening the city’s peripheral walls and fortifications to keep out the enemy”, write 
Misselwitz and Weizman: 
 “here, since the enemy was already inside the city, the city had to be 
controlled from within. The city fabric itself, its streets and houses, that had 
to be adapted accordingly  […]. Military control was exercised on the 
drawing board, according to the rules of design, fashion and speculative 
interests” (2003, 272) 
 
Here there are sometimes striking continuities between the colonial and supposedly 
‘postcolonial’ city. In an episode that sadly would be repeated  in the same city 56 years 
later by the Israelis, in 1936, the British took 4,200 kilos of explosives to the refugee camp 
in Jenin and destroyed a whole quarter of the town. This was an act of collective 
punishment at the continuing resistance to their occupation of Palestine  (Corera, 2002).   
A similar process of urban remodelling by demolition, aimed at undermining resistance, 
occurred in Jaffa in the same year (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 ‘Operation Anchor’ : The use of explosives by the British to carve 
boulevards through the Palestinian Casbah in Jaffa in 1936, to improve the 
strategic control of the British over the settlement (source : Misselwitz and 
Weizman, 2003, 275) 
 
Modernism and Urban War I : Aerial Living as Response to Aerial War 
 
Our third illustration centres on  the first of two deep connections that run between 
modernist urbanism and aerial bombing. For Le Corbusier’s famous obsession with 
loosely-spaced modern towers set in parkland  -- most famously elaborated in his Ville 
Radieuse or ‘Radiant City’ (1933) --were not just a celebration of light, air, sunlight and the 
modern house as a ‘machine for living in’.  They were also a reaction to a widespread 
obsession in 1930s Europe with the need to completely re-plan cities so that they 
presented the smallest possible targets the to massed ranks of heavy bombers then being 
fielded by the major powers. Corbusier’s towers -- variants of which had hardened ‘anti-
aircraft’ bomb-proof roofs --  were also designed to lift residents above expected gas 
attacks (Markou,  2002).   
 
Like the Italian futurists before him, Le Corbusier celebrated the modernism of the aircraft 
machine and its vertical destructive power. “What  a gift to be able to sow death with 
bombs upon sleeping towns”, he wrote (1935, 8-9).  His response to the “sinister 
apotheosis” of death and destruction heralded by aerial warfare was the total demolition of 
the old city, and its replacement by a modern utopia specifically designed to be “capable of 
emerging victorious from the air war” (1935, 60-61). 
 
Post 9/11 – an event which seemed to underline the extreme vulnerability of skyscrapers -- 
it seems painfully ironic that the dreams of that arch celebrator of sky scrapers were, in 
fact, partly intended to reduce the city’s exposure to aerial annihilation. The famous 
modernist architectural theorist Sigfried Gideon -- who was strongly influenced by Le 
Corbusier’s views --  argued in 1941 that: 
“the threat of attack from the air demands urban changes. Great cities 
sprawling open to the sky, their congested areas at the mercy of bombs 
hurtling down out of space, are invitations to destruction. They are 
practically indefensible as now constituted, and it is now becoming clear 
that the best means of defending them is by the construction, on the one 
hand, of great vertical concentrations which offer a minimum surface to 
the bomber and, on the other hand, by the laying out of extensive, free, 
open spaces” (1941, 543). 
 Modernism and Urban War II : Aerial Bombing as a “New Chance” 
 
Following the war, as the scale and scope of devastation became clear,  preservationists 
achieved some limited success in rebuilding parts of some cities along old lines. Many 
ruined buildings -- churches  especially -- were also preserved as war memorials. The 
British War Artist Kenneth Clark even argued that “bomb damage itself is picturesque” 
(Woodward, 2001, 212).  
 
Our fourth illustration centres on the way in which devout modernists saw the 
unimaginable devastation as an unparalleled opportunity to reconstruct entire cities 
according to the principles of Le Corbusier and other modernist architects. As part of the 
‘brave new word’ of post war reconstruction, modernist planners and architects seemed in 
many cases to be almost grateful that the deadly work of the bombers had laid waste to 
waste urban landscapes of traditional, closely built streets and buildings (Tiratsoo et al, 
2002).  
 
For example, one pamphlet, published in the UK by John Mansbridge during World War II 
(Figure 3), expressed gratitude to that modernist icon, the aeroplane. Not only had it “given 
us a new vision” but it had offered Britain “a new chance by blasting away the centres of 
cities”. Thus, it continued, modernist reconstruction would now be delivered to sustain “the 
swift flow of modern traffic for the play of light and air” (ibid.). 
 
Figure 3 Illustration’s from John Mansbridge’s (n.d) British World War II 
pamphlet Here Comes Tomorrow celebrating both the modernism of aircraft 
and the ‘new chance’ their bombing offered British cities to rebuild along 
modernist lines (source : Tiratsoo et al, 2002, 57). 
 
Meanwhile, in Germany, the closing stages of World War 2 saw Third Reich planners 
preparing to totally disperse the City of Hamburg – which had been so devastated by the 
fire storm raids of 1943 – as a test case in the wholesale ‘deurbanisation’ of German 
society. When the founder of the Bauhaus, Walter Gropius, returned to Germany in 1947, 
to advise on post war reconstruction, he argued that the urban devastation in Germany  
meant that it was “the best place to start breaking up cities into home towns and to 
establish small-scale communities, in which the essential importance of the individual 
could be realised” (cited in Kostof, 1992, 261).  
 
Thus, in a way, the total bombing of total war  -- a massive act of planned urban 
devastation in its own right -- served as a massive accelerator of modernist urban 
planning, architecture and urbanism. The tabula rasa that every devoted modernist craved 
suddenly became the norm rather then the exception, particularly in the city centres of post 
war Europe. As a result, to use the words of Ken Hewitt (1983, 278), “the ghosts of the 
architects of urban bombing – (Guilo) Douhet, (Billy) Mitchell, (Sir Hugh) Trenchard,  
(Frederick) Lindemann – and the praxis of airmen like (‘Bomber’) Harris and (Curtis) 
LeMay, still stalk the streets of our cities”. 
 
Cold War Urban Geopolitics  
 
In our fifth illustration, Cold War cities were often deliberately remodelled as a function of 
them resting at the centre of the nuclear cross-hairs. As Matthew Farish (2003) and 
Jennifer Light (2003)  show, the familiar story of deconcentration and sprawl in post war 
US cities, for example, was not just fuelled by Federal subsidies, the Interstate highway 
program, a deepening anti-urbanism, and ‘White Flight’. It was also actively encouraged 
my military strategists to reduce the United States’ strategic vulnerability to a massive first 
nuclear strike by the Soviet Union.  
 
As well as burrowing underground (McCamley, 1998, Vanderbilt, 2002), massive efforts 
were made to make city’s sprawl.  In the United States, especially, vast new suburban 
tracts were projected as domesticated citadels, populated by perfect nuclear families living 
the ‘American dream’ yet also shaped to be resilient in the face of atomic Armageddon 
(Zarlengo, 1999, McEnaney, 2000).  Core cities, mean while, were widely portrayed by 
popular media and planners as inherently risky and unsafe, a politics of fear that mixed 
tragically with the wider racialisation of urban centrality in postwar America and further 
fuelled central city decline (Galison, 2001).  
 
Planning as ‘Urbicide’ : Post-War Urban ‘Renewal’ and 
 the Military-Industrial  Complex in the USA 
 
A sixth illustration is the critical influence of such quasi-military urban planning on the huge 
effort at urban ‘renewal’ in the post-war United States. One of it’s arch proponents, Robert 
Moses -- who was major of New York City for much of this period -- believed that, in 
modernising New York, "when you operate in an overbuilt metropolis you have to hack 
your way through with a meat ax" (quoted in Berman, 1982, 307). Following the 
displacement of 50,000 as an highway was carved through the Bronx, for example, Moses 
helped set in train a  war-like process of disintegration which by the 1970s “had become 
spectacular, devouring hose after house and block after block, driving hundreds of 
thousands of people from their homes” (Berman, 1996, 172). Marshal Berman argues that 
the scale of devastation – if not the human lives lost – in such programmes, means that 
the Bronx needs to be seen in the same light as the all-out, or guerilla wars of  Berlin, 
Belfast Beirut. Along with several other authors he even coins the word ‘urbicide’  -- or “the 
murder of the city” – to describe all these, and many other cases (1996, 175). 
 
Robert Goodman, writing in his 1972 book After the Planners, argued that a US-wide drive 
for such ‘urban renewal’ actually amounted to little but a exercise in racist (anti-black) state 
violence on a  par with the genocidal attacks on the indigenous North Americans that 
drove them to the edge of extinction (see Porteous and Smith, 2001, chapter 4).  
 
Importantly, major military research and development bodies like RAND, STC and MITRE 
had major inputs into the statistical analyses, operations research strategies, and ‘rational’ 
planning doctrines that fuelled the huge scale of Cold War ‘urban renewal’ and 
comprehensive redevelopment in the US (Light, 2002, 2003). Thus, in many cases, the 
‘sciences’ of urban and military strategy became extremely blurred and interwoven during 
this period. On the one hand, city governments pledged ‘war’ against the ‘urban crisis’ (see 
Farish, 2003). On the other, the military industrial complex sought to gain finance and 
power by reshaping civil strategic spaces in cities  (Beauregard, 2003). The result was 
that, “by 1970, the military-industrial complex had successfully done what it had set out to 
do at the start of the decade – expand its market to city planning and management” (Light, 
2002).  
 
Whilst rarely discussed, such planning-based urbicide is still extremely widespread around 
the world.  For example, countless informal settlements continue to be bulldozed around 
the planet in the name of modernisation, freeway-construction, economic development,  
‘hygiene’, and the improvement of a city’s image (see, for example, Patel et al, 2002). 
 
Urban Ruination  and the Politics of ‘Unbuilding’ 
 
It is crucial to stress – in our seventh illustration - that, after decades of urban crises of 
various sorts and an entrenchment of global, neoliberal restructuring the discipline of 
urban planning is now confronting ‘the radical contingency of the metropolis’ in many 
guises and many places. The world is littered with failed utopian, modernist urban 
landscapes. Many of these now resemble dystopian sites of ethnic battles, economic and 
social collapse, financial meltdown,  or physical decay (Olalquiaga, 1995, Buck-Morss, 
2000).  
 
The continuum of organized, urban violence is  thus complicated by the fact that much 
‘planned’ urban change even in times of ‘peace’ itself involves war-like levels of violence, 
destabilisation, rupture, forced expulsion, and place annihilation (Berman, 1996). Particularly 
within the dizzying peaks and troughs of capitalist urbanism state-led planning often boils 
down to the legitimised clearance of vast tracts of cities in the name of the removal of decay, 
modernisation, improvement, ordering, economic competition, or facilitating technological 
change and capital accumulation and speculation. “The economically, politically and socially 
driven processes of creative-destruction through abandonment  and redevelopment,” 
suggests David Harvey, “are often every bit as destructive as arbitrary acts of war. Much of 
contemporary Baltimore, with its 40,000 abandoned houses, looks like  a war zone to rival 
Sarajevo“(Harvey, 2003, 26). 
 
As  a result, in paradigmatic modern cities like, Detroit, for example, much urban planning 
doctrine and effort  now centres on the politics of ‘unbuilding’ rather than building 
(Daskalakis et al, 2001). As in many other US core cities, old industrial European cities, 
and Asian and Latin American megacities confronting recent financial collapses, the 
challenge here is to ‘plan’ not for growth, prosperity and modernisation. Rather, it is to try 
and overcome obsolescent structures, abandoned neighbourhoods, half-built  or half-
ruined cityscapes, decayed infrastructures and war-like levels of gang, ethnic, and drug-
related violence and arson (Vergara, 1997, 1999). Often, such “enclaves of disinvestment 
reverse normal codes of controlled development; they are pockets of free-fall urban 
implosion, partaking of  a frenzied violence […]. Here the police plead for their own 
automatic weapons, pleading to be outgunned by teenage gangs” (Shane, 1995, 65).   
 Terror vs. ‘War on Terror’ :  
City-Targeting, Orbital Power, and New Wars  
 
“While at one time war elsewhere guaranteed peace at the centre of the 
empire, now the enemy strikes precisely and more easily at the centre 
[…]. War abroad no longer guarantees peace at home” (Eco, 2003, 7) 
 
“Cities are especially vulnerable to the stresses of conflict […].  City-
dwellers are particularly at risk when their complex and sophisticated 
infrastructure systems are destroyed and rendered inoperable, or when 
they become isolated from external contacts” (Barakat, 1998, 12) 
 
All of which leads neatly to our eighth vignette : a brief analysis of the central role of cities 
and urban spaces within the current ‘3rd world war’ pitching ‘super terrorism’ against 
counter terrorism.  Five brief points need to be stressed here.  
 
Everyday Infrastructures as Weapons of War 
 
First, the potential for catastrophic violence against cities and urban life has changed in 
parallel with the shift of urban life towards ever-more distanciated, transnational, and 
flows-based systems and networks.  The result of this is that the everyday technics, 
spaces and infrastructures of urban life – airliners, metro trains, computer networks,  water 
systems, electricity grids,  trade networks, food systems, medical systems, scientific 
research grids -- may be easily assaulted and turned into agents either of instantaneous 
terror or debilitating demodernisation (Luke, 2004, Graham, 2001).  In a ‘24/7,’ ‘always-on’ 
and intensively networked society, urbanites become so reliant on taken-for-granted 
infrastructural  and computerised systems that they creep ever closer to the point where, 
as Bill Joy puts it, “turning off becomes suicide” (2000, 239). In particular, given that all the 
‘Big Systems’ that sustain advanced, urban societies are profoundly electrical, we become 
“hostages to electricity” (Leslie, 1999). All this means that “tremendous lethal capabilities 
can be created simply by contra-functioning the everyday applications of many technics “ 
(Luke, 2004).  
 
Most obviously, this applies to the airline suicide attacks of 9/11 (Graham, 2002), 
Palestinian bus bombers, or the Moscow metro attacks of February 2004. But it also 
applies to the much less well known efforts of US and Israeli militaries to systematically 
demodernise entire urban societies in the past few decades. It is striking that he 
‘innovations’ underpinning both informal and state terror, to use the words of Timothy 
Luke,  “mobilize assets for attacks that destructively activate the embedded threats of 
large technical systems, everyday logistics, and civil offensive capabilities” (2004). 
 
Thus, the murderous 9/11 attacks simply turned banal capsules of  everyday, inter-urban 
mobility into anti-urban cruise missiles. A massive perversion of everyday mobility systems 
orchestrated for saturation real-time coverage, these attacks brought an overwhelmingly 
symbolic and mediatised act of  urban mass murder to a devastating conclusion (Graham, 
2001, Luke 2004).   
 
Similarly, the deliberate US bombing of electrical systems in Kosovo in 1999, and Iraq in 
2001 – often using graphite ‘soft’ bombs designed to generate massive short circuits and 
fires – led to a vast pressure on those societies by effectively de-electrifying, and de-
modernising, them (Graham, 2004a). Between 1991 and 2003, for example, as a result of 
the bombing and the following sanctions, Iraq was a modern, highly urban society forcibly  
“relegated to a pre-industrial age”  by state violence (United Nations, 1999, cited in 
Blakeley, 2001, 32). Even a  leading US Air Force planner had to  concede  that this direct 
targeting of so-called ‘dual-use’ (military/civilian)  electrical infrastructure in 1991 “shut 
down water purification and sewage treatment plants. As a result, epidemics of 
gastroenteritis, cholera, and typhoid broke out, leading to as many as 100,000 civilian 
deaths and the doubling infant mortality rates” (Rizer, 2001). Over the next decade, over 
500,000 Iraqi civilians were to die because the war and the sanctions forced a modern, 
urban society to live without the basic, life-sustaining systems that are needed to keep it 
alive. This was a classic case, as  Ruth Blakeley (2001) has put it, of ‘bomb now, die later’.  
 
As US forces move into the new terrain of ‘cyber war’ or ‘computer network attack’ so 
they have developed detailed knowledge of the software systems that sustain basic, 
everyday infrastructure in potentially adversarial cities and states. In 2002,  Major 
General Bruce Wright, Deputy Director of Information Operations at the Center at Joint 
Warfare Analysis Center at Dahlgren (Va.), revealed that his team “can tell you not just 
how a power plant or rail system [within an adversary’s country] is built, but what exactly 
is involved in keeping that software system up and making that system efficient” (cited in 
Church, 2002).  
 
The Urbanisation of War : 
Cities as Refuge from Orbital and Aerial  Hegemony 
 
“Some people say to me that the Iraqis are not the Vietnamese ! They 
have no jungles of swamps to hide in. I reply, ‘let our cities be our 
swamps and our buildings our jungles’” (then Iraqi foreign minister, 
Tariq Aziz, October 2002, quoted in Bellamy, 2003, 3). 
 
Second, the relative anonymity of urban life renders cities as the last sites of refuge from 
the globe-spanning, high-tech military omnipotence of US surveillance and killing. The 
complex, congested and contested terrain below, within, and above cities is seen by many 
within the US military as a set of physical spaces which limit the effectiveness of high-tech 
space-targeted bombs, surveillance systems, and automated, ‘network-centric’ weapons. 
These derive their power from the United States massive dominance in space-based 
satellite targeting, navigation and surveillance (Graham, 2004b). Such weapons and 
information systems have been deliberately developed  in the last thirty years, under the 
auspices of the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, to ensure that the US remains a 
pre-eminent global military power  with ‘full spectrum dominance’ over its potential 
challengers (Gray, 1997). The widespread urbanisation of potential ‘battlespace’  is 
therefore  seen to reduces the ability of U.S. forces to fight  and kill at a distance (always 
the preferred way because of their ‘casualty dread’ and technological supremacy). And, as 
is being revealed in the Iraqi guerrilla war, urban warfare is also seen to necessitate a 
much more labour, and casualty-intensive way of fighting than the US is used to these 
days.  
 
”The long term trend in open-area combat is toward overhead dominance by US forces,”  
writes Ralph Peters (1996, 6), an influential US observer of  what might be termed the 
urbanisation of war. “Battlefield awareness may prove so complete, and ‘precision’ 
weapons so widely-available and effective, that enemy ground-based combat systems 
will not be able to survive in the deserts, plains, and fields that have seen so many of 
history’s main battles.” As a result, he argues that the United States’ “enemies will be 
forced into cities and other complex terrain, such as industrial developments and inter-
city sprawl” (1997, 4). 
 
Peters’s military mind recoils in horror at the prospect of US forces habitually fighting in 
the majority world’s burgeoning megacities and urbanizing corridors (see also Rosenau, 
1997, Spiller 2000). To him, these are spaces where “human waste goes undisposed, the 
air is appalling, and mankind is rotting” (1996, 2). Here cities and urbanisation represent 
decay, anarchy, disorder and the post Cold War collapse of ‘failed’ nation states.  “Boom 
cities pay for failed states, post-modern dispersed cities pay for failed states, and failed 
cities turn into killing grounds and reservoirs for humanity’s surplus and discards (guess 
where we will fight)” (1996, 3).   
 To Peters, the pivotal geo-strategic role of urban regions within the post-Cold War period 
is stark and  clear. “Who cares about Upper Egypt if Cairo is calm ?”, he writes.  “We do 
not deal with Indonesia – we deal with Jakarta. In our [then] recent evacuation of Sierra 
Leone Freetown was all that mattered” (1997, 5). Peters also candidly characterises the 
role of the US military within the emerging neoliberal ‘empire’ with the USA as the central 
military enforcer (although he obviously doesn’t use these words)(see Hardt and Negri, 
2000). “Our future military expeditions will increasingly defend our foreign investments”, 
he writes, “rather than defending [the home nation]  against foreign invasions. And we will 
fight to subdue anarchy and violent ‘isms’ because disorder is bad for business. All of this 
activity will focus on cities”.  
 
Such urban warfare ‘expeditions’  have been central to the United State’s post Cold-War 
strategy. In a parallel process of  what might be termed the ‘urbanisation of war’ 
(Graham, 2004c, Part II), they are also the basis for the intensifying efforts of  Israeli 
forces to systematically demodernise Palestinian cities. All these aggressions have 
devastated, and immiserated, the fragile systems that allow urban societies to function. 
Arguably -- at least in the case – the attacks have been so comprehensive and complete 
that we have witnessed a case of ‘urbicide’ – the denial, or killing, of the city (see 
Graham, 2003, 2004d, Safier, 2001, Berman, 1996). Thousands of dwellings have been 
demolished (Figure 3). Infrastructure systems have been systematically ripped up by the 
claws of bulldozers (Figure 4). And whole refugee camps deemed to be the symbolic or 
actual centres of  resistance to occupation -- both through the horrific programme of 
suicide bombing in Israeli cities, and other means -- have been bulldozed in the 
culmination of brutal urban battles (Figure 5). Urban areas have had the life literally 
strangled out of them by extending arrays of checkpoints, curfews and barriers, 
combined with the progressive annexation of water resources and the destruction and 
annexation of agricultural land. The Palestinian population has been brutalised like never 
before, with 2194 civilians killed between September 2000 and October 21st 2003 alone  
(Graham, 2004d).  
 
Figure 4  A series of video capture images showing the claw of an Israeli 
Defence Force  D-9 Bulldozer being used to destroy a Palestinian road and 
water network in Bethlehem as part of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, April 
2002. Photographer : A Palestinian activist who wishes to remain 
anonymous. 
 
Figure 5 The banality of urbicide : Israeli Defense Force soldiers preparing 
to blow up a Palestinian home in the Tul Quarem refugee camp in the West 
Bank, 2002. Photographer : Nir Kafri, 2003. 
 
Figure 6: Aerial photograph of the destruction of the Hart-Al-Hawashin 
district in the centre of the Jenin refugee camp caused by Israeli bulldozers 
(used by permission from Public Relations Branch, Israeli Defense Forces) 
 
The Language and Legitimation of War 
 Thirdly,  as always, these urban wars are being made and legitimised through language. 
Both Sharon’s assaults on Palestinian cities, and Bush’s assaults on Iraqi and Afghan 
ones, have been justified through indiscriminate, Orientalist, categorisations. This 
language -- what has been termed the ‘new barbarism’ -- does huge political work. It 
does this by separating “the civilised world” [Israel or the U.S.] – who’s ‘homeland’ cities 
must be ‘defended’ – from the “dark forces” which are alleged to threaten the health, 
prosperity, and democracy of both these spaces and the ‘free’ world (Tuastad, 2003, 
Tisdal, 2003, Kaplan, 2003).  
 
Thus, such rhetoric conveniently lumps together the residents of whole nations as 
sources of ‘terrorism’. As Derek Gregory (2003, 311) has shown,  such language 
sustains the demodernisation, as well as demonisation, of whole Islamic or Arab urban 
societies.   By ‘casting out’ the subject civilians of those cities, these people, crucially, are 
“placed beyond the privileges and protections of the law so that their lives (and deaths) 
[are] rendered of no account”. In then forcibly creating a kind of chaotic urban hell, 
through state terror, violence, and the deliberated destruction of modern urban 
infrastructures, this violence, perversely,  produces what the discourses depict : an urban 
world “outside of the modern, figuratively as well as physically” (ibid. 313).  
 
Urban War and ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ 
 
Fourth, such destruction, and the new strategy of pre-emptive war also, of course, create 
opportunities for predatory, imperial gain. This is especially so as they are located within 
a globalising, neoliberal, political economy centred on the rapacious accumulative 
appetite of politically-favoured transnationals for both urban and infrastructural assets 
and strategic raw materials  (Kirsch, 2003, Harvey, 2003b).  
 
Certainly, the US invasions of key parts of the strategic zones of central Eurasia and the 
Middle East have paved the way for  what David Harvey (2003a, chapter 4) has called 
“accumulation by dispossession’. This has operated through the privatisation of assets 
and infrastructures in conquered lands and the handing over of these assets, and natural 
resource rights, to the massive corporations that are almost inseparably woven into the 
Bush regime. Even moderate commentators like Michael Ignatieff now admit that the 
high-tech ‘war on terror’ is, essentially, a classic, imperialistic strategy adjusted to the 
demands of a US-centred, network-based, neoliberal ‘empire’ based on commercial 
control backed up by military dominance (Ignatieff, 2003;  see Hardt and Negri, 2000, 
Klein, 2003). “This war, like most of the wars that preceded it, is firmly rooted in 
geopolitical competition” (Klare, 2001, 4). As Dyer-Witheford has argued, it remains the 
case that, “at its cutting edge, capitalist globalization means war” (1999, 157). 
 
Urban Cosmopolitanism and Competing Fundamentalisms 
 
Finally, cities constitute the front line of the ‘war on terror’ in another crucial way. As the 
critical sites of diasporic mixing, and the destination points for global migration, cities 
provide the multicultural environments which are being stretched across  the resurgent 
‘them’ and ‘us’ boundaries  that are (re)emerging in the wake of 9/11, the ‘war on terror’, 
and the drive for ‘homeland security’  (Sassen, 1999).  What future for urban 
multiculturalism, or for the global-local flows of migration and diaspora formation, in a 
world where “the rhetoric of ‘insides’ needing protection from external threats in the form 
of international organizations is pervasive” (Dalby, 2000, 5) ? 
 
Ironically, 9/11 itself symbolised that this telescoping of the world’s political violence into 
the city (and vice versa)  was  now inescapable. “If it existed, any comfortable  distinction 
between domestic and international, here and there, us and them, ceased to have 
meaning after that day” (Hyndman, 2003, 1).   
 
On the one hand, then, the 9/11 attacks can be seen as part of a fundamentalist, 
transnational war, or Jihad,  by radical Islamic movements against pluralistic and 
heterogeneous mixing in (capitalist) cities (Buck-Morss, 2003). This loosely affiliated 
network of radical Islamic terror organisations need to be considered as one of a large 
number of social movements against what Castells calls the “new global order” (2004, 
108). Heterogeneous mixing of ethnicities and religious groups holds no place within 
umma, the transnational fundamentalist Islamic space that  these movements are 
struggling to establish (Castells, 2004, 111).  Thus, it is notable that cities that have long 
sustained complex heterogeneities, religious pluralism, and multiple diasporas – New York 
and Istanbul, for example -- have been  prime targets for catastrophic terror attacks. 
Indeed, in their own horrible way,  the grim lists of casualties on that bright New York day 
in September 2001 revealed the multiple diasporas and cosmopolitanisms that now 
constitute the very social fabric of ‘global’ cities like New York. As Watson writes: 
 “global labor migration patterns have […] brought the world to lower 
Manhattan to service the corporate office blocks: the dishwashers, 
messengers, coffee-cart vendors, and office cleaners were Mexican, 
Bangladeshi, Jamaican and Palestinian. One of the tragedies of September 
11th 2001 was that it took such an extraordinary event to reveal the everyday 
reality of life at the heart of the global city” (2003, 109). 
 
On the other hand, Bush’s neoconservative and neoimperial  ‘war on terror’ also 
problematises such urban cosmopolitanism. It, too, undermines both the possibility, and 
the legitimacy, of city-based democratic pluralism and dissent against the ‘new global 
order’.  In asserting a binaried split between “the civilised and savage throughout the social 
circuitry,” the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric of the Bush regime, and the policies based on it, have 
produced a “constant scrutiny of those who bear the sign of ‘dormant’ terrorist” (Passavant 
and Dean, 2002, cited in Gregory, 2003). It has also “activite[d[ a policing of points of 
vulnerability against an enemy who inheres within the space of the US” (ibid.). 
 
A ‘domestic front’ has thus been drawn in Bush’s ‘war on terror’. Sally Howell and Andrew 
Shryock (2003) call this a “cracking down on diaspora”. This  process involves deepening 
state surveillance against those seen to harbour ‘terrorist threats,’ combined with a 
radically increased effort to ensure the filtering power of national borders (see Molotch and 
McLain, 2003, Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). After decades when the business press  
triumphantly celebrated the ‘death of distance’, or the imperative of opening borders to the 
‘free’ movements  of neoliberal  globalization, post 9/11,  “in both political debates and 
policy practice, borders are very much back in style” (Andreas, 2003, 1).  
 
Once again, then, nations, as well as strategic cities, are being (re)imagined as bounded, 
organised spaces with closely controlled, and filtered,  relationships with the supposed 
terrors of the outside world.  Global geopolitical tensions, and attempts to bolster 
‘homeland security’,  have telescoped into policies shaping immigration controls, social 
policies addressing asylum seekers, and local policies towards multicultural and diasporic 
communities in cities.  In the US, for example, national immigration, border control, and 
social policy strategies have been dramatically remodelled since 9/11 in an: 
 “attempt to reconstitute the [United States] as a bounded area that can be 
fortified against outsiders and other global influences. In this imagining of 
nation, the US ceases to be a constellation of local, national, international, and 
global relations, experiences, and meanings that coalesce in places like New 
York City and Washington DC; rather, it is increasingly defined by a ‘security 
perimeter’ and the strict surveillance of borders ” (Hyndman, 2003, 2 ; see 
Anderson, 2002).  
 
The ‘hybrid’, transnational identities of many neighbourhoods and communities in cities,  
shaped  by generations of migration and diasporic mixing,  are thus becoming 
problematised.  Inevitably, such places and groups are being ‘stretched’  across the 
resurgent ‘them’ and ‘us,’ or ‘home’ and ‘foreign,’ binaries that are being imposed.  Many 
people, spaces and communities in Western cities are thus becoming ‘othered’ simply 
because they are perceived to be associated with ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim terrorists’ (Hall, 2003).  
 
Homeland/Globe :  War, ‘Security’,  and the  
Geopolitics  of Production and Consumption 
 
“Every generation has a taboo and ours is this : that the resources upon 
which our lives have been built are running out” (Monbiot, 2003, 25)  
 
Which brings us neatly to our penultimate example of the inseparability of contemporary 
war and urbanism. This centres on the ways in which the reconstruction of landscapes and 
consumption habits in the wealthy cities of the advanced industrial world, with their 
profound implications for geopolitical competition, impact on security, terror and urbanising 
war elsewhere (Le Billon, 2001). A powerful case of these important but poorly researched 
connections comes with the growing fashion for large, 4-wheel drive ‘Sports Utility 
Vehicles’ in Western, and particularly, US cities.  
 
Given the very high degree of influence of major US oil companies on the Bush regime, 
there is growing evidence of direct connections between the fashion for more and more 
profligate use of oil in sprawling US cityscapes ; the geopolitical remodelling of US defence 
forces ; and the so-called ‘War on terror’ through which the US government is achieving a 
high level of geopolitical control of the world’s largest untapped oil reserves, in and around 
the Caspian Basin (Kleveman, 2003).  9/11 has thus been ruthlessly exploited. In 
particular the 9/11 attacks provided the “catastrophic and catalysing event” that was 
identified by the influential 1997 report Project for a New American Century -- including 
Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz -- as necessary to allow the U.S. to justify the 
invasion of Iraq with any hope of legitimacy (Harvey, 2003b, 15).  
 
Whilst the US strategy is not necessarily about directly controlling oil resources per se, 
there is little doubt that “it is about ensuring that whoever controls it buys and sells it in 
U.S. dollars through the New York commodities market”  that lies a few hundred meters 
from ‘ground zero’ (Halevi and Varoufakis, 2003, 66).  There is little doubt that a key 
objective of the US attack on Iraq was to install  a US-friendly oil producing regime there 
that would eventually displace the Saudis as the main ‘swing producer’, allowing the 
United States (and not OPEC) to regulate the international price of oil (Gregory, 2004a, 
Harvey, 2003).  
 
Three key points are crucial here. First, SUVs were fashioned and marketed after the first 
Gulf War as  quasi-mlitarised ‘urban assault  luxury vehicles’ (Rampton and Stauber, 
2003). Clotaire Rapaille, a psychological consultant to major U.S. SUV manufacturers, 
reveals that his research suggests that Americans want “aggressive cars” that can be 
thought of as “weapons” or “armored cars for the urban battlefield”. The design and 
marketing of such vehicles, he argues – with their names like ‘Stealth’ and ‘Warrior’ -- 
needs to tap into, and address, their consumers’ fears about contemporary urban life (cited 
in Rampton and Stauber, 2003, 138).  
 Post 9/11, it is now clear that advertisers have been deliberately exploiting widespread 
fears of catastrophic terrorism to further increase sales of highly-profitable SUVs. Rapaille 
has recently been urging the main auto manufacturers to address the fact that “the 
Homeland is at war” by appealing to buyers’ most primitive emotions (ibid., 139). 
 
Second, the SUV is being enrolled into urban everyday life as a defensive capsule or 
“portable civilization” -- a signifier of safety that, like the gated communities into which they 
so often drive, is portrayed in advertisements as being immune to the risky and 
unpredictable urban life outside (Garner, 2000).   Such vehicles seem to assuage the fear 
that the urban middle classes feel  when moving – or queuing in traffic – in their 
‘homeland’ city.  
 
Subliminal processes of urban and cultural  militarisation are going on here. This was most 
powerfully illustrated by the transformation of the US army’s ‘Humvee’ assault vehicle into 
the civilian ‘Hummer’ just after the first Iraq war – an idea that came from the Terminator 
film star (and now California Governor) Arnold Schwarzenegger (who promptly received 
the first one off the production line). Andrew Garner writes that: 
“For the middle classes, the SUV is interpreted culturally as strong and 
invincible, yet civilised. In the case of the middle class alienation from the 
inner city, the SUV is an urban assault vehicle. The driver is transformed  
into a trooper, combating an increasingly dangerous world. This sense of 
security felt when driving the SUV continues when it is not being driven. 
The SUV’s symbols of strength, power, command and security becomes 
an important part of the self-sign […]. With the identification of enemies 
within our borders, this vehicle has become  a way of protecting 
members of the middle class from any threat to their lifestyle” (2000, 6). 
 
Finally,  the fact that SUVs account for over 25% of US car sales has very real impacts on 
the global geopolitics of oil. With their consumption rates of double or triple normal cars, 
this highly lucrative sector  clearly adds directly to the power of the neo-conservative and 
ex-oil executive ‘hawks’ in the Bush regime to drive forward the above-mentioned strategy 
of colonisation by dispossession. This is especially so as they have operationalised their 
perpetual ‘war on Terror’ in ways that are helping the USA to secure  access to the huge, 
low-priced, oil reserves that the United States argues it needs to fuel its ever-growing level 
of consumption. (Currently these stand at 25.5% of global consumption to sustain a  
country with less than 5% of the world’s population).  
 
Clearly, then, the profligate oil consumption and militarised design of SUVs “takes on 
additional significance in the light of the role that dependency on foreign oil  has played in 
shaping U.S. relations with countries in the Middle East” (Rampton and Stauber, 2003, 
139).   
 
“The economic, cultural and military infrastructure that undergrids US Middle East policy 
will not be so easily undone,” writes Tim Watson, “and without its wholesale reform or 
dismantling, Islamic terrorists will not so easily disappear” (2003, 110). As with the 
cosmopolitan nationalities of the dead, then, so the events of 9/11, in their own way, reflect 
and symbolise the deep connections between urban everyday life and city form and the 
violence spawned by geopolitical conflict and imperialist aggression.  Watson writes that 
he has been haunted since 9/11 by images of the hundreds of vehicles abandoned, never 
to be recovered,  at rail stations by commuters to the twin towers in the states of New 
York, Connecticut and New Jersey. “These symbols of mobility” became, instead: 
 “images of immobility and death. But these forlorn, expensive cars and 
SUVs also represent a nodal point between the US-domestic economy 
and a global oil market in which Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Iraqi production is 
still so important” (2003, 110-111). 
 
‘A Geopolitics of Urban Decay and Cybernetic Play’   :  
Popular Culture Blurs With  Military Strategy  
 
“War is the new psychotropic. War precludes our doubts. War preserves our 
right to pursue overabundance. War closes the circle. It creates anxiety; it 
cures anxiety. It defines our alienation ; it resolves our alienation.” (Hart, 
2003, 16) 
 
Our final vignette centres on the ways in which the neglect of place annihilation in urban 
social science has left the connections between today’s cities, and the curious obsession 
with ruined cities and post-apocalyptic urban landscapes in contemporary popular culture,  
largely unexplored.  This is important because cities are unmade and annihilated 
discursively as well as through bombs, planes and terrorist acts.  As various electronic 
media become ever-more dominant in shaping the tenor of urban culture, so their 
depictions of cities crucially affect collective notions of what cities actually are of what they 
might actually become.   
 
Increasingly, in these post-modern times, cities  are depicted as sites of ruination, fear and 
decay, rather than ones of development, order or ‘progress’.   As long ago as the mid 
1960s, Susan Sontag observed that most sci-f films, for example, are about the “aesthetic 
of destruction, the peculiar beauties to be fond in wreaking havoc, making a mess” (1966, 
213). Crucially, this means that millenia-old  “link between civilization and barbarism is 
reversed: City life turns into a state of nature characterised by the rule of terror, 
accompanied by omnipresent fear” (Diken and Laustsen 2002, 291).  
 
This shift taps into a  century or more of apocalyptic, anti-urban, literature and films – from 
H.G. Wells’s (1908) War in the Air  to vast ranges of  atomic-age and cyberpunk fiction. All 
of this predicts in its own way the final victory of weapons of annihilation over the very 
possibility of a conventional urban life (see Franklin, 1988).  Adding to this, a swathe of 
recent post-apocalyptic films have so shaped the collective culture of urbanism that the 
stock response to the 9/11 catastrophe was that “it was just like a scene in a movie!”  
Whilst their output paused after 9/11 they are now back in full flow (Maher, 2002). Mike 
Davis has argued that the 9/11 attacks: 
“were organised as epic horror cinema with meticulous attention to the 
mise-en-scéne.  The hijacked planes were aimed precisely at the 
vulnerable border between fantasy and reality […].  Thousands of 
people who turned on their televisions on 9/11 were convinced that the 
cataclysm was just a  broadcast, a hoax. They thought they were 
watching rushes from the latest Bruce Willis film […]. The  ‘Attack on 
America’, and its sequels, ‘America fights back’ and ‘America Freaks 
Out’, have continued to unspool as a succession of celluloid 
hallucinations, each of which can be rented from the video shop : The 
Siege, Independence Day, Executive Action, Outbreak, The Sum of All 
Fears, and so on ” (2002, 5).  
 
Indeed, the complex links between virtual, filmic, and televisual representations of city-
killing, and actual acts of urban war, are becoming so blurred as to be almost 
indistinguishable. At least amongst US forces, the real targeting of cities is being 
remodelled as a ‘joy stick war’. This operates through ‘virtual’ simulations, computerised 
killing systems, and a growing distanciation of the operator from the sites of the killing and 
the killed.  In the process,  the realities of urban war -- at least for some -- start  to blur 
seamlessly with the wider cultures of sci-fi, film, video games and popular entertainment 
(Thussu and Freedman, 2003).  
 
As war is increasingly consumed by a voyeuristic public, so digital technologies bring the 
vicarious thrills of urban war direct to the homes news-hungry consumers.  Consumption 
of the Iraq war by  people in the US, for example,  offered a wide range of satellite image-
based maps of the City as little more than an array of targets ,to be destroyed from the air, 
in newspapers or  on media websites. Thus: 
“The New York Times provided a daily satellite map of Baghdad as a city of 
targets. On the web, USA Today’s interactive map of ‘Downtown Baghdad’ 
invited its users:   “Get a satellite-eye view of Baghdad. Strategic sites and 
bombing targets are marked, but you can click on any quadrant for a close 
up’. The site also included images of targets ‘before’ and ‘after’ air strikes. 
The Washington Post’s interactives invited the viewer to ‘roll over the 
numbers to see what targets were hit on which day ; click to read more 
about the targets” (Gregory, 2004b, 29). 
 
In a perverse twist, corporate media and entertainment industries increasingly provide both 
computer games and films which virtually simulate recent urban wars to mass participants, 
and  the virtual and physical simulations of cities that US forces use to hone their warfare 
skills for fighting in Kabul, Baghdad, or Freetown. Take, for example, the unmanned, low 
altitude ‘Predator’ aircraft that are already being used for extra-judicial assassinations of 
alleged ‘terrorists’ (and whoever happens to be close by) in the Yemen, Afghanistan and 
Iraq whilst being ‘piloted’ from  a Florida air base 8 or 10,000 miles away.  For the US 
military personnel doing the piloting, this ‘virtual’ work is almost indistinguishable  from a 
‘shoot-em-up’ video game (except that the people who die are real). “At the end of the 
work day”, one Predator operator recently boasted during Gulf War II, “you walk back into 
the rest of life in America” (quoted in Newman, 2003). 
 
This is one example of the ways in which  the actual prosecution of wars is merging more 
and more with electronic entertainment industries. “The US military is preparing for wars 
that will be fought in the same manner as they are electronically represented, on real-time 
networks and by live feed videos, on the PC and the TC actually and virtually” (Der Derian, 
2002, 61). The “military now mobilizes science fiction writers and other futurologists to plan 
for the wars of tomorrow just as they consciously recruit video-game playing adolescents 
to fight the same conflict” (Gray, 1997, 190). 
 
James Der Derian (2001) coins the term the “military-industrial-media-entertainment 
network”  to capture the deepening and increasingly insidious  connections between the 
military, defence industries,  popular culture and electronic entertainment.  Here, huge 
software simulations are constructed to recreate any possible urban warfare scenario, 
complete with vast forces, casualties, the gaze of the media and three dimensional, real-
time participation by thousands. Hollywood specialists of computer generated films provide 
extra ‘realism’ in the these simulations ; their theme park designers, meanwhile,   help in 
the construction of the ‘real’ urban warfare training cities that are dotted across the USA. 
Major ‘invasions’ – such as the ‘Urban Warrior’ exercise in March 1999 – are even 
undertaken on major US cities from air, land and sea to further improve training both for 
foreign incursions and the control of major domestic urban unrest.  Civilians are employed 
in these exercises to play various parts (Willis, 2003). Such mock invasions have even 
been proposed as local economic development initiatives for declining city cores. 
 
Finally, the US military are deepening their connections with corporate news media, so 
that the ‘information warfare’ side of their operations – i.e. propaganda – can be more 
successful. Just as Al Qaida timed the second plane’s impact on 9/11 so that the world’s 
news media could beam it live to billions of astonished onlookers, so the ‘Shock and Awe’ 
strategy at the start of the US bombing of Baghdad was  a carefully orchestrated media 
spectacle (with the world’s TV journalists lined up in a  major hotel a short, but safe, 
distance way from the carefully selected -- and empty -- buildings that were pin-pointed for 
GPS-base destruction).  Thus, both formal and informal attacks against cities emerge as 
rhizomatic, internationally networked operations orchestrated with global media 
representation in mind. Both Al Qaeda and the U.S. Military are  transnational 
organisations concerned as much with symbolic  effects as with  the real devastation of 
local sites (Zizek, 2003). “This war takes place in the invisible space of the terror imaginary 
of the U.S. (attacks on buildings and government, germ infection, etc.) and in the visibly 
impoverished landscape of Afghanistan” (Aretxaga, 2003, 144). 
 
James Lukaszewiski, a US public relations counsellor who advises the US military, admits 
that the links between terrorist organisations and  the global media are equally insidious: 
“media coverage and terrorism are soul mates – virtually inseparable. 
They feed off each other. They together create a dance of death – the 
one for political or ideological motives, the other for commercial success. 
Terrorist activities are high profile, ratings-building events. The news 
media need to prolong these stories because they build viewership and 
readership” (cited in Rampton and Stauber, 2003, 134). 
 Claire Sponster  (1992) terms the particular obsession with decayed cityscapes within 
cyberpunk depictions on urban futures a “geopolitics of urban decay and cybernetic play”. 
Whilst these have moved beyond the common sci-fi obsession with post nuclear cities 
during the Cold War : 
“the physical settings of [such] cyberpunk stories look strikingly like the 
settling of any post-holocausts story: blighted, rubble-strewn, broken-down 
cityspaces; vast terrains of decay, bleakness, and the detritus of 
civilization; and the near complete  absence  of a benign and beautiful 
nature” (ibid. 253) 
 
The vast array of ‘virtual reality’ and simulation games, where players can be masters of 
urban annihilation, further demonstrate the blurring of the actual and virtual killing of urban 
places (and their inhabitants).  Three ranges of games are relevant here.  
 
First, there are simulated urban construction games -- like the SimCitiesTM series. In 
these participants  endlessly construct, and destroy, cityscapes in repeated cycles of 
virtual urban cataclysms (Sponser, 1992, Bleecker, 1994). One SimCityTM introduction 
and guide available on the Web describes the fascination with virtual urban destruction 
amongst players thus: 
“My name is Dr Wright and I will be your guide and teacher as you set out 
to crate bustling cities of sprawling urban wastelands. As Major, the choice 
is yours. Let’s start off by destroying Tokyo ! Studies show that nine out of 
ten mayors begin their careers with a  frenzy of destruction […]. Another 
curious fact about SimCityTM mayors is that one disaster is never enough. 
The reasoning goes something like this: “gee, that monster was great, but 
there must be half a dozen buildings stills standing. I wonder what it would 
take to destroy EVERYTHING !” […] Simply point at the disaster(s) of you 
choice and push B to activate it” (original emphasis). 
 
Second, there are virtual combat games designed to allow western users to ‘fight’ 
enemies in far-off cities. These provide omnipotent players with ‘realistic – and often 
devastated – (usually Middle Eastern) cities in which to annihilate racialised and 
dehumanised enemies again and again.  The rhetoric and marketing of such games, 
echoing George Bush’s nationalistic discourses of ‘protecting freedom’ and ‘ensuring 
democracy’, imply that the task of the player is to infiltrate these cities to rid the world of 
‘terrorists’ and so ‘fight for freedom’.  
 
The urban war of your choice – Black Hawk Down (Mogadishu),  Gulf War I, Gulf War II, 
the LA Riots, a myriad of urban ‘anti-terrorist’ operations’ -- can thus be electronically 
simulated and consumed as entertainment.  The comments of participants are very 
telling here.  For example, a Black Hawk Down player  admits that “those graphics  are  
so sweet you can almost feel the bullets whizz past your head and ricochet off walls 
around you. The scenery is good although if you are spending time admiring it then your 
already dead !.” Another gushes: 
“when you're trapped in the middle of a hostile situation and completely 
surrounded, it really does get the heart pumping […].When I first jumped 
into a helicopter, took off, saw the enemy in the city streets below and then 
activated the helicopter’s mini-gun it was such a rush ! I also enjoyed being 
able to use gun emplacements and firing massive mini-guns from the 
choppers and watching the empty shell casings bouncing off the tin roofs [of 
‘Mogadishu’] below!.” 
 
A third range of games brings urban war to the ‘homeland’. Here the challenge is to 
destroy terrorists who are in the process of unleashing instant and unknown catastrophes 
on western cities. One user of the “Tom Clancy Rainbow Six Rogue Spear Platinum” 
urban warfare game describes its challenges. “Urban Operations really add to the 
gameplay,” he says, “with missions in live public areas (London underground, open top 
markets etc). You can even shoot out the lights! [The spaces are] full of public people. And 
if a stray shot should kill any member of the public... Game Over !” (comments taken from 
amazon.co.uk ; original emphasis).  
 
Conclusion  : Looking at Ruins 
 
 
“The human race is, and has always been, ruin-minded” 
(Macaulay, 1964, 264) 
?
“The ruins are painful to look at, but will hurt more in the long run if 
we try not to see” (Berman, 1996, 185). 
?
“Wounded cities, like all cities, are dynamic entities, replete with the 
potential to recuperate loss and reconstruct anew for the future” 
(Schneider and Susser, 2003, 1) 
 
To conclude this extended essay, it is strikingly clear that urbanists and urban 
researchers can no longer neglect either attempts to deny, destroy or annihilate 
cities, or the ‘dark’ side of urban modernity which links cities intimately to organised, 
political violence. In this ‘post 9/11’ and ‘post war on terror’ world, urban researchers 
and social scientists -- like everyone else – are being  forced to begin addressing 
their taboos about attempted city-killing, place annihilation, ‘urbicide,’  and the 
urbanisation of war. In a parallel process, international relations theorists,  
geopolitical researchers, and sociologists of war, are being forced to consider urban 
and sub-national spaces as crucial  geopolitical sites, often for the first time.  
 
As a result, researchers in both traditions are now  once again starting to explore, 
and excavate, the spaces and practices that emerge at the intersections of urbanism, 
terrorism and warfare  There is a growing acknowledgement that violent catastrophe, 
crafted by humans, is part and parcel of modern urban life. A much needed, 
specifically urban, geopolitics is thus slowly (re)emerging which addresses the 
telescoping connections between transnational geopolitical transformations and very 
local acts of violence against urban sites. This emerging body of work is trying to 
unearth, as Diken and Lausten put it,  “the way in which discipline, control, and terror 
coexist in today’s imaginary and real urban geographies” (2002, 291). 
 
As an exploratory synthesis, this essay has developed a particularly broad 
perspective of the ways in which  the purposive destruction and annihilation of cities, 
in  war, terror, planning and virtual play, is utterly interwoven with urban modernity. 
Two conclusions are apparent from this wide-ranging discussion 
 
First, as the gaze of critical urban social science starts to fall on the purposive 
ruination and annihilation of place, so this synthesis underlines five, related, urban 
research challenges. First, the research and professional taboos that cloak the 
geopolitical and strategic archaeologies, and spatialities, of  modern urbanism must 
be undermined, and understood. Second, the ‘hidden’, militarised  histories and 
spatialities of modern urban  planning and state terror must be excavated and 
relentlessly exposed. Third, the characteristics of city spaces and infrastructures that 
make them the choices par excellence of those seeking to commit terrorist acts 
require detailed analysis, as do the impacts of these acts on the shape, condition, 
and imagining of cities and urban life. Fourth, the telescoping, transnational 
connections between the geopolitics of war and ‘empire’, and political economies of 
production, consumption, migration, the media, and resistance require rigorous 
theorisation and analysis. And finally, the fast-growing, and usually hidden. worlds of 
‘shadow’ urban research, through which the world’s military perceive, reconstruct, 
and target urban spaces must be actively uncovered.   
 
Our second conclusion, of course, must be politically, rather than analytically, 
normative.  This reflects the palpable risk that a  global polarisation will emerge 
around the two alternative fundamentalisms that currently so threaten to destabilise, 
and devastate, our world. The clear imperative here is to forcibly reject both of the 
racist, masculinist fundamentalisms which are currently locked in a globe-spanning 
circle of intensifying atrocity and counter-atrocity. As Rosalind Petchesky has argued, 
these offer a choice between “the permanent war machine (or permament security 
state) and the reign of holy terror” (cited in Joseph and Sharma, 2003, xxi). 
Untrammelled, the self-perpetuating cycles of atrocity between urban terror and state 
counter-terror, that these discourses legitimise and sustain, offer up an extremely 
bleak urban future indeed. This, perhaps, is the ultimate urban dystopia ? For it is 
crucial to realise, as the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire demonstrates, that  informal 
terror and state counter-terror tend to be umbilically connected. In the end, they tend, 
tragically, to be self-perpetuating in an endless circle of intensifying atrocity (Graham, 
2004d). As Zulaika argues: 
“the ultimate catastrophe is that […] a categorically ill-defined, perpetually 
deferred, simple minded Good-versus-Evil war [‘against terror’] echoes 
and re-creates the very absolutist mentality and exceptionalist tactics of 
the insurgent terrorists. By formally adopting the terrorists’ own game – 
one that by definition lacks rules of engagement, definite endings, clear 
alignments between enemies and fiends, or formal arrangements of any 
sort, military, political, legal, or ethical – the inevitable danger lies in 
reproducing it endlessly” (2003, 198), 
 As a global polarisation threatens to occur between those who are pro-‘western’ and 
those who are pro-‘radical Islam’ – stoked by sickening and self-fulfilling circles of 
informal and state terror and fundamentalist propaganda – one thing is sure. 
Normatively, cities must be seen as key sites, perhaps the key sites,  for nurturing the 
tolerances, diasporic mixings, and multicultural spaces that are needed to push 
fundamentalist fantasies of all sorts to the lunatic fringes where they belong (Safier, 
2001, Sandercock, 2003). Arguably, our planet currently faces no greater challenge. 
 
 
Note 
 
The author would like to acknowledge the support of the British Academy, 
without which the research that led to this essay would not have been possible. 
Thanks also to the referees of the paper for their valuable comments. All the 
usual disclaimers apply. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Agier,  M. (2002), “Between war and the city : Towards an urban anthropology of 
refugee camps”, Ethnography, 3(3), 317-341. 
Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995), Mastering Space. London: Routledge. 
Aly, G. and Heim,  S. (2002), Architects of Annihilation : Auschwitz and the Logic 
of Destruction,  Wiedenfeld and Nicholson : London. 
Anderson, J. (2002), “Borders after 11 September 2001”,  Space and Polity, 
6(2), 227-232. 
Andreas, P. and Biersteker, T. (2003),(eds.)  The Rebordering of North 
America, New York : Routledge. 
Appadurai, A. (1996), Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, 
Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press. 
Aretxaga,  B. (2003), “Terror as thrill : First thoughts on the ‘war on terrorism”. 
Mimeo. 
Ashworth, G. (1991), War and the City, London and New York: Routledge. 
Barakat, S. (1998), “City war zones”, Urban Age, Spring, 11-19. 
Beauregard, R. (2003), Voices of Decline : The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities,  2nd 
edition, New York : Routledge. 
Bellamy C (2003), “If the cities do not fall to the Allies, there may be no 
alternative to siege warfare”,  The Independent, 28 March, 3. 
Berman,  M. (1996), “Falling towers : City life after urbicide”. In D. Crow (ed.), 
Geography and Identity, Washington : Maisonneuve Press. 172-192. 
Bishop, R.  and Clancey, G. (2003), “The city as target, or perpetuation and 
death”. In R. Bishop, J. Phillips and W.W. Yeo (eds.), Postcolonial Urbanism, 
New York : Routlede, 63-86. 
Bleecker, J. (1994), "Urban crisis : Past, present and virtual", Socialist Review, 
24, 189-221. 
Bollens, S. (2001), “City and soul : Sarajevo, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, 
Nicosia”, City, 5(2), 169-187. 
Blakeley, R. (2001), “Bomb now, die later”. Available at 
www.geocities.com/ruth-blakeley/bombnowdielater/htm, accessed January 
2004. 
Braudel, F. (1973), Capitalism and Material Life, New York ; Harper and Row. 
Buck-Morss, S. (2000), Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass 
Utopia in East and West, Cambridge, Ma. : MIT Press. 
Buck-Morss, S. (2003) Thinking Past Terror : Islamicism and Critical Theory on 
the Left, London : Verso. 
Bugeaud, M. (1997), La Guerre des Rues at Des Maison, Jean-Paul Rocher,: 
Paris. 
Castells, M. (1997), The Power of Identity, (1st edition) Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (1998), The End of Millennium, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. (2004), The Power of Identity, (2nd edition) Oxford: Blackwell. 
Catterall, R. (2001), “Cities under siege : September 11th and after”, City, 
special collection, 5(3), 383-438. 
Church, W. (2002), “Information warfare”. Available at www.icrc.org 
(February 2004). 
Cole, T.  (2003), Holocaust City : The Making of  a Jewish Ghetto, London : 
Routledge. 
Corera, G. (2002), “The British in Jenin”. Available at 
www.bbc.couk/radion4/today/reports/international/jenin.shtml (September 2003). 
Coward, M. (2002), “Community as heterogeneous ensemble : Mostar and 
multiculturalism”, Alternatives, 27, 29-66. 
Dalby, S. (2000). “A critical geopolitics of global governance”. Available at 
www.ciaonet.org/isa/das01/ (September 2003). 
Daskalakis, G., Waldheim, C., and Tound, J. (eds.), Stalking Detroit, Actar : 
Barcelona. 
Davis, M. (2002),  Dead Cities. New York: The New Press. 
Der Derian, J. (2001), Virtuous War : Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-
Entertainment Complex, Boulder, Co. : Westview. 
Der Derian, J. (2002), “Cyberspace as battlespace: The new virtual alliance of 
the military, the media and the entertainment industries”. In J. Armitage and J. 
Roberts (eds.), Living With Cyberspace,  London : Continuum.  61-71. 
Diken, B.  and Laustsen, C. (2002), “Security, terror, and bare life”, Space and 
Culture, 5(3), 290-307. 
Diken, B. and Laustsen,  C. (2003), “’Camping as a contemporary strategy : From 
refugee camps to gated communities”, AMID Working Paper Series, 32, Aalborg 
University. 
Driver, F. and Gilbert, D. (2003), (eds.), Imperial Cities, Manchester ; Manchester 
University Press. 
Dyer-Witheford, N. (1999), Cyber-Marx : Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in 
High-Technology Capitalism, Chicago : University of Illinois Press. 
Easterling, K. (2002), “Enduring innocence”. In M. Sorkin  and S. Zukin, (2002), 
After the World Trade Center, New York : Routledge. 189-196. 
Eco, 2003 
Farish, M. (2003), “Disaster and decentralization: American cities and the Cold 
War”, Cultural Geographies, 10, 125-148. 
Franklin, H., (1988), War Stars: The Superweapon and the American 
Imagination, New York: Oxford U. Press. 
Galison,  P. (2001), “War against the center”, Gray Room, Summer, 6-33. 
Garner, A. (2000), “Portable civilizations and urban assault vehicles”, Techné ; 
Journal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, 5(2), 1-7. 
Giddens, A.  (1985), The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge, Polity.  
Gideon, S. (1941), Space, Time and Architecture, Cambridge, Ma. : Harvard 
University Press. 
Goodman, J. (1972),  After the Planners, Basic Books : New York. 
Graham, S. (2002) “In a moment : On glocal mobilities and the terrorised 
city”, City, 5(3), 411-415. 
Graham, S. (2003), “Lessons in urbicide”, New Left Review, 19, Jan/Feb, 63-78. 
Graham, S. (2004a), “On war in the ‘weirdly pervious world’ :The geopolitics of 
infrastructural demodernisation”.  Unpublished manuscript. 
Graham, S. (2004b), “Vertical geopolitics : Baghdad and after”, Antipode (in 
press). 
Graham, S. (2004c), Cities, War and Terrorism : Towards an Urban Geopolitics, 
Oxford : Blackwell. 
Graham, S. (2004d,) , “Constructing urbicide by bulldozer in the Occupied 
territories”. In S. Graham, (ed.), Cities, War and Terrorism : Towards an Urban 
Geopolitics, Oxford : Blackwell (jn press). 
Graham, S. and Marvin, S. (2001), Splintering Urbanism: Networked  
Infrastructure, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition, London: 
Routledge.  
Gray, C. (1997), Postmodern War : The New Politics of Conflict,  London : 
Routedge. 
Gregory, D. (2003), “Defiled cities”, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 
24(3), 307-326. 
Gregory,  D. (2004a), “Spaces of exception and the ‘war on terror’”. Paper 
available from the author at gregory@geog.ubc.ca?
Gregory, D. (2004b), The Colonial Present, Blackwell : Oxford. 
Halevi, J. and Varoufakis,  Y. (2003), “The global minotaur”, Monthy Review, 
July-August, 57-75. 
Hall,  R. (2003), “A note on September eleventh: The Arabization of 
terrorism”, The Social Science Journal, 40, 459-464. 
Hardt, M.  and Negri, A. (2000), Empire, Harvard University Press : 
Cambridge, Ma. 
Hart, J. (2003), “Untitled”, Adbusters, 51, 16. 
Harvey, D. (2003a), The New Imperialism,  Oxford University Press ; Oxford. 
Harvey, D. (2003b), “The city as a body politic”. In J. Schneider and I. 
Susser, (eds.) Wounded Cities: Destruction and Reconstruction in a 
Globalized World . London : Berg. 25-46. 
Hewitt K. (1983), “Place annihilation: Area bombing and the fate of urban places”, 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73(2), 257-284. 
Hewitt, K. (1987), “The social space of terror : Towards a civil interpretation of 
total war”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 5, 445-474. 
Howell, S. and Shryock, A. (2003), “Cracking down on dispaora : Arab 
Detroit and America’s ‘War on Terror’”, Project Muse, Available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu 
Hyndman, J. (2003), “Beyond either/or: A feminist analysis of September 
11th”, ACME : An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. Available 
at  www.acme-journal.org (October 2003).  
Ignatieff, M. (2003), Empire Lite, Minerva : New York. 
Joseph, A. and Sharma, K. (2003), Terror and Counter-terror : Women 
Speak Out, London : Zed. 
Joy, W. (2000), "Why the future doesn't need us", Wired, April, 238-260. 
Kaldor, M. (1999), New and Old Wars : Organised Violence in a Global Era, 
Cambridge; London. 
Kaplan, A. (2003), “Homeland insecurities : Reflections on language and 
space”, Radical History Review, 85, 82-93. 
Kirsch,  S. (2003), “Empire and the Bush doctrine”, Environment and Planning D : 
Society and Space, 21, 1-6. 
Klare, M. (2001), “The geopolitics of war”, The Nation, November 5th, 4. 
Klein, N. (2003), “Iraq is not America’s to sell”, The Guardian, November 7, 
27. 
Kleveman,  L. (2003), “The new Great Game”, The Guardian, October 20th, 
17. 
Kostof,  S. (1992), The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form Through 
History, London: Thames and Hudson. 
Lang P. (ed.), Mortal City, New York: Princeton Architectural Press. 
LeBillon, P. (2001), “The political ecology of war : Natural resources and armed 
conflicts”, Political Geography, 20, 561-584. 
Le Corbusier (1933), Aircraft, Milan : Abitaire Segesta. 
Le Corbusier (1935), La Ville Radieuse, Elements D'Une Doctrine D'Urbanisme 
Pour L’Equipement De La Civilisation Machiniste. Boulogne  : Editions De 
L'Architecture D'Aujourd'Hui. 
Leslie, J. (1999), "Powerless", Wired, April, 119-183. 
Light, J. (2002), “Urban security : From warfare to welfare”, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research, 26(3), 584-561. 
Light, J. (2003), From Warfare to Welfare : Defense Intellectuals and Urban 
Problems in Cold War America, Baltimore : Johns Hopkins. 
Maher, K. (2002), “Back with a bang”, The Observer, 30 June, available at 
www.guardian.co.yj(September 2003). 
Luke, T. (2004), Everyday techniques as extraordinary threats: Urban 
technostructures and nonplaces in terrorist actions”. In S. Graham, (ed.), Cities, 
War and Terrorism : Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Oxford : Blackwell (jn press). 
Macaulay, R. (1964), The Pleasure of Ruins, London : Thames ad Hudson. 
Maldonado-Torres, N. (2004), “The topology of being and the geopolitics of 
knowledge : Modernity, empire, coloniality”, City ( this issue). 
Markou, E. (2002), “Militariers et urbanistes durant les années trente”,  Les 
Annales de la Recherche Urbaine, 91, 91, 18-27. 
McCamley,  N. (1998), Secret Underground Cities, Barnsley : Leo Cooper. 
McEnaney, L. (2000), Civil Defense Begins at Home : Militarization Meets 
Everyday Life in the Fifties, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press. 
Mendieta, E. (2001), “The space of terror, the uropian city : On the attack on the 
World Trade center”, City, 5(3), 397-406. 
Misselwitz, P.  and Weizman, E. (2003), “Military operations as urban planning”. 
In Franke, A. (ed.) Territories, KW Institute for Contemporary Art : Berlin. 272-
275. 
Molotch, H. and McClain, N. (2003), “Dealing with urban terror: heritages of 
control, varieties of  intervention, strategies of research”, International 
Journal of Urban and regional Research, 27(3), 679-698. 
Monbiot, G. (2003), “Bottom of the barrel”, The Guardian, December 2, 25. 
Mumford,  L. (1959), “The morals of extermination”, Atlantic, 204, 38-47. 
Mumford, L. (1961), The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its 
Prospects. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Muschamp, H. (1995), “Things generally wrong in the universe.” In P. Lang (ed.), 
Mortal City, New York: Princeton Architectural Press. 102-107. 
Newman, R. (2003), “The joystick war”, U.S. News, 19th May, Available at 
www.usnews.com June 2003. 
Olalquiaga,  C. (1995), “Paradise lost”. In S. Allen (ed.) Sites and Stations : 
Provisional Utopias, Lusitiania : New York. 43-50. 
Ó Tuathail, G. (1999),  Critical Geopolitics. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Passavant, P. and Dean, J. (2002), “Representation and the event”, Theory and 
Event, 5(4) (available at 
http:/muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/voo5/5.4passavant.html) 
Patel, S., D’Cruz, C. and Burra, S. (2002), “Beyond evictions in a  global city : 
People-managed resettlement in Mumbai”, Environment and Urbanization, 14(1), 
159-172. 
Peters, R.  (1996), “Our soldiers, their cities”, Parameters, Spring, 1-7. 
Peters, R.  (1997), “The future of armored warfare”, Parameters, Autumn, 1-9. 
Picon, A. (ed), (1996), La Ville et La Guerre, Paris : L’Impremeur. 
Pieterse, J. (2002), “Globalisation, kitsch and conflict : Technologies of work, war 
and politics”, Review of International Political Economy, 9(1), 1-36. 
Porteous, J.  and Smith, S. , (2001), Domicide : The Global Destruction of Home,  
Montreal and Kingston : McGill--Queen’s University Press. 
Prodanovic,  M. (2002) “Urbicide and the chances for reconstruction of 
Balkan cities”. In J. Ockman, (ed.), Out of Ground Zero : Case Studies in 
Urban Reinvention, Berlin : Prestel Berlag,  138-149. 
Rampton, S.  and Stauber,  J. (2003), Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of 
Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq,  London : Robinson. 
Rizer, K. (2001), “Bombing dual-use targets: Legal, ethical, and doctrinal 
perspectives”, Air and Space Power Chronicle. Available at 
www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Rzer/html (accessed January 
2004). 
Rosenau,  W. (1997), “Every room is a new battle : The lessons of modern 
urban warfare”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20(4), 371-394. 
Rössler, M. (1989), “Applied geography and area research in Nazi society : 
Central place theory and planning, 1933-1945”, Environment and Planning D: 
Society and Space, 7, 419-431. 
Safier,  M. (2001),  “Confronting ‘urbicide’: Crimes against humanity, civility 
and diversity and the case for a civic-cosmopolitan response to the attack 
on New York”, City, 5(3), 416-429. 
Said, E. (1993), Orientalism, London : Penguin. 
Sandercock,  L. (1998) (ed.), Making the Invisible Visible: A Multicultural Planning 
History,  Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Sandercock,  L. (2003), Cosmopolis II : Mongrel Cities in the 21st Century, 
London : Athlone. 
Sassen, S. (1999), Guests and Aliens, New York : New Press. 
Sassen, S. (2002), “Governance  hotspots : Challenges we must confront in the 
post September 11th world”. In  K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision 
: Terror and the Future of Global Order,  Macmillan Palgrave : London. 313-324. 
Scheper-Hughes, N. and Bourgois, S. (2003)(eds.), Violence in War and 
Peace: An Anthology, Oxford : Blackwell. 
Sebald, W.G. (2003) On the Natural History of Destruction, London: Hamish 
Hamilton. 
Shane, D. (1995), “Balkanization and the postmodern city”. In P. Lang (ed.), 
Mortal City, New York: Princeton Architectural Press. 154-69. 
Shaw, M. (2001), “New wars of the city”, Mimeo. 
Shaw, M. (2003), War and Genocide. Cambridge, Polity. 
Schneider, J.  and Susser, I.  (2003), (eds.) Wounded Cities: Destruction 
and Reconstruction in a Globalized World . London : Berg. 
Sontag,  S. (2003), “The telling shot”, The Guardian Review, 1st February, 4-8. 
Sontag, S. (1966), “The imagination of disaster”. In S. Sontag Against  
Interpretation, New York; Dell, 203-218. 
Spiller, R. (2000), Sharp Corners : Urban Operations at Century’s End, Fort 
Leavonsworth, Ka. Staff College Press. 
Sponster,  C. (1992), “Beyond the ruins : The geopolitics of urban decay and 
cybernetic play”, Science Fiction Studies, 20(2), 2251-265. 
Sun Tzu (1963) The Art of War. Samuel B. Griffith (trans.). London, Oxford.  
Thompson, E. (1982),  “Notes on exterminism :  The last stage of civilization.” In 
New Left Review, (ed.), Exterminism and Cold War, London, Verso. 
Thussu, D.  and Freedman,  D. (2003)(eds.) War and the Media,  London : Sage. 
Tiratsoo, N., Hasegawa, J., Mason, T. and Matsumura, T. (eds.), Urban 
Reconstruction in Britain and Japan, 1945-1955 : Dreams, Plans and Realities, 
Luton ; University of Luton Press. 
Tisdall, S. (2003), “Resist the official pol-speak of Bush’s ‘war on terror’”, 
The Guardian, November 4, 24. 
Tuastad, D. (2003), “Neo-Orientalism and the new barbarism thesis: 
Aspects of symbolic violence in the Middle East conflict(s)”, Third World 
Quarterly, 24(4), 591-588, 
United Nations, (1999),  Report of the Second Panel Established Persuant to by 
the Resident Of Security Council (S/1999/100) Concerning the Present 
Humanitarian Situation In Iraq, 30 March. 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1947a),  Effects of Incendiary  Bomb 
Attacks on Japan : A Report on Eight Cities, Washington DC : US Air Force. 
 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1947b), Fire Against Japan, 
Washington DC : US Air Force. 
Vanderbilt, T. (2002),  Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic 
America,   Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Vergara, C. (1997), The New American Ghetto, New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press.  
Vergara, C. (1999), American Ruins, New York : Monacelli.,  
Vidal, J. (2003), “Forced to slum it”, The Guardian, 10th October, 27. 
Vidler  A. (2001), “Photourbanism : Planning the city from above and below”. In 
G. Bridge and S. Watson (eds.), A Companion to the City, Oxford : Blackwell, 35-
45. 
Virilio, P. (1987), "The overexposed city", Zone, 1(2). 
Virilio, P. (1986), Bunker Archeology, New York: Princeton Architectural Press. 
Virilio,  P. (2002, Desert Screen : War at the Speed of Light, London : Continuum. 
Watson  T. (2003), “Introduction : Critical infrastructures after 9/11”, Postcolonial 
Studies, 6(1), 109-111. 
Weber, M. (1958), The City,  Glencoe, Il. : Free Press. 
Weizman, E. (2004), “Strategic points, flexible lines, tense surfaces and political 
volumes: Ariel Sharon and the geometry of occupation”. In S. Graham, (ed.), 
Cities, War and Terrorism : Towards an Urban Geopolitics, Oxford : Blackwell (jn 
press). 
Wells, H.G.  (1908) War in the Air , London : Penguin. 
Willis,  S. (2003), “Empire’s shadow”, New Left Review, July-August, 59-70. 
Woods  L.,(1995), “Everyday war”. In P. Lang (ed.), Mortal City, New York: 
Princeton Architectural Press. 46-53. 
Woodward,  C. (2001), In Ruins, London : Chatto and Windus. 
Zarlengo, K. (1999), “Civilian threat, the suburban citadel, and atomic age 
American women,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 24 (4), 925-
958. 
Zizek,  S. (2003), Welcome to the Desert of the Real ! London : Verso. 
Zulaika, J and Douglass, W. (1996). Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables 
and Faces of Terrorism. New York: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
